
On or about August 2, 1979, I received a telephone call from Senator Daniel K. Inouye’s Washington office. One of his administrative assistants read me a draft of what became Senate Bill 1647 calling for the establishment of a “Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC).” The call came because I had been advising the staff of the Japanese American Citizens League and others about the campaign for redress. After hearing the draft I commented that it sounded good to me except that the word “internment” was inappropriate and that “incarceration” was a more accurate term.

She asked what the difference was, and I explained that “internment” was an ordinary aspect of declared wars and referred to a legal process, described in United States statutes, to be applied to nationals of a country with which the United States was at war. I pointed out that perhaps eight thousand Japanese nationals had been formally interned by the government during World War II, beginning as early as the night of December 7, 1941, and that, although a great deal of injustice accompanied this wartime internment, it was conducted legally, and those interned got a semblance of due process. What happened to most of the West Coast Japanese Americans in 1942, I continued, should not be described with a word describing a legal process, even though the phrase “internment” was widely used not only in the literature but by many Japanese Americans. After some discussion she said that the difference was clear to her and that the bill’s text would be changed. In a second phone call, the next day, she told me that, unfortunately, the senator had not waited for my vetting and had secured the agreement of a number of other senators to co-sponsor the bill and that he would not countenance any changes.

Thus, not for the first time, inappropriate, euphemistic language was employed, officially, to describe what happened to West Coast Japanese Americans in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Although, over time, the consciousness of Japanese and other Americans has been raised, most notably by the successful redress movement which resulted in the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which eventually produced both an apology and a payment of $20,000 to more than eighty thousand survivors, most of the literature about the wartime events still uses language created during and immediately after World War II. In this essay I will first outline, briefly, the history of
statutory internment in American history, and then trace and analyze some of the inappropriate language that has been used and try to show why it is important to call things by their right names and how the use of such language helped to mask the true nature of an American war crime.

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Internment has long been recognized in both American and international law. By World War II it was regulated by a system of rules—the Geneva Convention—which governed the treatment of prisoners of war and was sometimes extended to civilian enemy nationals, including diplomats, resident in or captured by a belligerent nation. Although the first statute to use the term “alien enemy” was passed during John Adams’s administration, there was no formally declared war, and no internment occurred. The first actual internment by the United States government occurred during the war of 1812 when some resident British, mostly merchants, were ordered to remove themselves fifty miles inland. British merchants in New York City, for example, were interned, but left at liberty up the Hudson at Newburgh.

The United States next resorted to the process during World War I. At that time there were about half a million unnaturalized resident aliens of German birth in the United States who were proclaimed “alien enemies” as soon as the United States declared war in April 1917. Some eight thousand enemy aliens—the vast majority of them Germans and almost all the rest subjects of Austria-Hungary—were arrested under presidential warrants, but nearly three-quarters of them were released within a short time. Only about 2,300 enemy nationals resident in the United States were actually interned, 90 percent of them German and all but a few of them male.

During World War II, internment of Germans and Italians began more than two years before the United States formally entered the war in December 1941. A few seamen from German vessels stranded in U.S. ports were interned shortly after the outbreak of war in September 1939, as were, after June 1940, perhaps a thousand Italians, seamen and a group of food workers from the Italian exhibition at the New York World’s Fair of 1939. All of these were persons without permanent resident status; no resident aliens were interned in the period before the United States went to war.

Shortly after the fall of France, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which required, for the first time in American history, that all resident aliens register annually at post
offices and keep the government apprised of any change of address. Among the several million registrants were 695,363 Italians, 314,715 Germans, and 91,858 Japanese, so that, after the United States went to war, there were about a million unnaturalized natives of the Axis powers resident in the United States, all of whom were, according to both American and international law, potential internees.

When war came President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed three similar public proclamations on December 7 and 8, 1941, which, under the authority of sections 21<N>24 of Title 50 of the United States Code, declared that Japan, Germany, and Italy were at war with the United States and that, accordingly, in the language of the law, “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [those countries], being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be in the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies.” Austrian and Korean resident aliens, who had German and Japanese nationality respectively, were not declared enemy aliens.

The Roosevelt administration never intended to intern any sizable percentage of those million alien enemies. Attorney General Francis Biddle, a civil libertarian of sorts, and his staff in the Department of Justice wanted a minimal program and were aware of the gross injustices suffered by German and Italian resident aliens in Winston Churchill’s Great Britain. In preparation for war, various federal security agencies, military and civilian, had prepared Custodial Detention Lists, better known as the “ABC Lists,” master indexes of persons who were, allegedly, potentially dangerous subversives. The “A” list consisted of persons identified as “known dangerous” aliens; the “B” list contained individuals who were “potentially dangerous”; and the “C” list was composed of people who merited surveillance due to pro-Axis sympathies or propaganda activities. As is common for internal security lists, they were largely based not on investigations of individuals, but on “guilt by association,” as most of the names came from membership and subscription lists of organizations and publications deemed subversive.

It is not yet possible and may never be to give precise figures for either the total number of persons interned or how many there were of each nationality. Several civilian agencies, chiefly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the military authorities made arrests, and the surviving records are incomplete. Until spring 1943, civilian internees were largely under military custody; most were then transferred to the INS, which had held some civilians since early in the war. At various times the INS reported,
with what seems like studied vagueness, on the number of persons it held, but its reports do not always make clear what categories of persons were being counted. In late 1944 J. Edgar Hoover reported that 14,807 enemy aliens had been taken into custody by the FBI, of whom nearly two-fifths had “been ordered interned by the Attorney General and the military authorities.”

Hoover’s seemingly precise figures leave room for doubt: early in the war many individuals were arrested by various local authorities and held under military auspices in places like Camp Forrest, Tennessee, and they probably were not included in his totals. Given the current state of our knowledge, the best “guesstimate” of the total number of persons actually interned is something under 11,000, broken down as follows: Japanese, perhaps 8,000; Germans, perhaps 2,300 (coincidentally about the same number as in World War I), and only a few hundred Italians. Many more had been arrested and held in custody for days and even weeks without being officially interned. In addition, the United States government brought more than 2,264 Japanese (chiefly from Peru), 4,058 Germans, and 288 Italians into the United States from a total of fifteen Latin American countries, and interned them. And finally, more than 3,100 Japanese, initially incarcerated by the War Relocation Authority (WRA), were later turned over to the INS for internment.

When the internment program started in 1939 there were no existing internment camps. Many of the first, pre-Pearl Harbor German and Italian internees were housed for a time at Ellis Island, Angel Island, and aboard their own ships; others were sent to INS camps set up in existing permanent army barracks and other federal buildings, where conditions were often more comfortable than in the later purpose-built or converted camps. Most of the prewar Italians, for example, were sent to Fort Missoula, Montana, where they lived in brick barracks with steam heat. Eventually most internees wound up in INS internment camps, primarily in Louisiana, Texas, and New Mexico. The facilities and living conditions in all of these camps for enemy aliens were superior to those in the concentration camps in which Japanese American United States citizens were held, partly because the U.S. State Department insisted that Geneva Convention conditions be maintained in them in the hope that the Axis powers, or some of them, would reciprocate.

Once war actually came, the often-competing American security agencies, civilian and military, constantly raised the number of persons to be interned. J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, for example, had a pre-Pearl Harbor list of 770 Japanese aliens who would require detention in case of war. Yet, a little over two months after Pearl Harbor, it had managed to find almost three times that many to intern. And so it went. Almost certainly very few of
those interned were really threats to American national security. To be sure, many if not most of them were rooting for their native lands, but the same could be said for many of the million plus uninterred alien enemies. Many others were simply torn by conflicting loyalties, such as the Italian immigrant who had written President Roosevelt shortly before Pearl Harbor that “since Italy is my mother and the United States is my father . . . I don’t want to see my parents fighting,” and got interned for his pains.

Often, especially early in the war, alien enemies were arrested in their homes in the dead of night, told to pack a bag, and hauled off to the nearest custodial facility, usually a local jail. Sometimes their families did not hear from them for days or even weeks. But many of those arrested were released relatively quickly, and, as the numbers cited earlier indicate, only a minority of those taken into custody was actually interned. Many, perhaps most, internments fragmented families, as in many cases the interned man and all but a minuscule percentage of resident American internees was male was the only breadwinner in the household. In a number of such cases, wives and minor children, some of them United States citizens, voluntarily joined the family held in internment. One INS camp, in Seagoville, Texas, was chiefly for women and children, and eventually another at Crystal City, Texas, was set up for families.

In the case of the Japanese Americans, so many male leaders were seized that not just families but entire ethnic communities were decapitated. In addition, since many Japanese Americans kept their money in American branches of Japanese banks, their liquid assets were frozen as the Treasury Department seized and closed all enemy-owned banks. Eventually families were allowed to draw up to $100 a month of their own money.

Those who were actually interned had some recourse. Enemy Alien Hearing Boards, composed of three or more citizen volunteers, were established in every federal judicial district. Each internee had the right to have his or her case reviewed by such a board, which could recommend parole or internment but the attorney general was not obligated to accept board recommendations. The internee could have a relative, friend, or agent attend the hearing, but was not allowed to have legal counsel. Evidence of loyalty, testimonial letters, etc., could be presented to the board, but the internee was not entitled to know the nature of any charges against him or her or, in cases resulting from denunciations, the name of the accuser or even the existence of an accusation. Except for anecdotal evidence — (see below), we know next to nothing about such boards, the persons who staffed them, how they operated, the number of cases they reviewed, the
results of such reviews, or how their recommendations were treated by the Department of Justice. The review boards helped to ameliorate the internment process, as large numbers of their hearings eventually resulted in release. And, even if the review board hearing did not result in release the internee was not informed of its recommendation internees could forward appeals with supporting documents to the attorney general. However, some interned aliens did not want to be released, but instead signed documents indicating that they wished to be returned to their native lands as quickly as possible, which usually meant after the war.

As noted, Geneva Convention conditions generally applied. Diplomatic officials from the various “protecting powers” who looked after the interests of enemy nations within the United States inspected the internment camps regularly and made note of internee complaints. In addition to food, housing, and recreation, internees were entitled to free mail services within the United States and access to mail and parcels from their mother countries, supervised by the International Red Cross but subject to censorship.

Thus internees had a very different kind of existence from that of most Japanese Americans. While the decision to intern an individual may not have been just, internment in the United States generally followed the rules set down in American and international law. What happened to those West Coast Japanese Americans who were incarcerated in army and WRA concentration camps was simply lawless.

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In discussing language, perhaps the best place to start is with the three- and four-letter epithets that were all but universally used to describe persons of Japanese birth or descent. While it was common until very recently for most Americans to use ugly words to describe persons of color and others deemed to be “lesser breeds without the law” nigger, kike, wop, spic, chink, greaser, etc. none was more universally used than Jap or Japs. One cannot imagine, for example, a respectable politician using any of the other terms in the title of a magazine article, but Franklin Delano Roosevelt could propose to call a 1923 essay actually intended to minimize trans-Pacific antagonisms “The Japs A Habit of Mind.” Even a casual perusal of pre-World War II American newspapers and magazines shows that in both headline and text the word was often used to describe: 1) the Japanese government; 2) the people of Japan; and, more
rarely except on the Pacific Coast. 3) Japanese Americans. One does not have to be a student of semiotics to understand the dehumanizing effect of such continuous and casual usage. And, of course, once the United States and Japan were at war the usage multiplied. The language and visual contexts of World War II movies made in the 1940s and 1950s make it quite clear that while the actions of Germany and of most Germans were evil, a distinction was often made between “good” and “bad” Germans. The actions of the Imperial Japanese Government and the actions of not only its people but of persons of Japanese ethnicity anywhere were treated as the deeds of an evil race. Perhaps the most notorious example of the casual demonization of Japanese persons were the mid-December 1941 companion pieces in the two Luce news magazines, <i>Time</i> and <i>Life</i>, which purported to tell Americans “How to Tell the Japs from the Chinese” or “How to Tell Your Friends from the Japs.”<sup>xxv</sup> The <i>Life</i> article was illustrated by Milton Caniff, creator of the widely syndicated comic strip “Terry and the Pirates.” Almost two months later, on February 13, 1942, just six days before FDR signed Executive Order 9066, another popular cartoonist, Theodor Suess Geisel (1904–1991), a.k.a. Dr. Suess, drew a particularly vicious editorial cartoon for the left-wing New York City newspaper <i>PM</i> showing an endless stream of identical, grinning Japanese men coming from the Pacific Northwest to a building on the California coast labeled “Honorable 5th Column” to receive packages marked “TNT,” while atop the headquarters another of what we would now call the clones looks out to sea through a telescope. The cartoon is captioned “Waiting for the Signal From Home . . .” Popular culture had so infused the complex image of the “Jap” into the American mind that no further explication was necessary.<sup>xxvi</sup> It is possible to pile up similar examples ad infinitum.<sup>xxvii</sup> Government officials were well aware of this. Geisel, for example, was later commissioned as a captain in the Signal Corps and sent to Hollywood to help film director Frank Capra make propaganda films and cartoons to indoctrinate American servicemen and women.<sup>xxviii</sup> This well-established mind-set made it easy for government officials to use carefully chosen words to blind Americans to the fact that their government was systematically stripping some American citizens of their most basic rights by fiat.

Before examining that process in some detail, it might be well to remind ourselves of the conclusion of the CWRIC:<sup>xxix</sup>
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident nationals of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.

The stripping of rights began long before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. Within hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle, in addition to arranging for and enforcing the statutory proclamations affecting “alien enemies” as set forth in sections 21–24 of the United States Code, also ordered that the borders be closed to alien enemies and “all persons of Japanese ancestry.” Biddle, although he regarded himself as a protector of the rights of Japanese Americans and, at the eleventh hour protested ineffectively against mass incarceration, in practice allowed the rights of citizens of Japanese ancestry to be violated with impunity. Under pressure from the War Department and, according to his memoir, somewhat overawed by the elder cabinet colleague who headed it, Henry L. Stimson, the attorney general agreed, in memoranda exchanged between the departments on January 6, 1942, that, in effect, the Fourth Amendment rights of American citizens of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast to “be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” were null and void. The memoranda agreed that Department of Justice agents would make warrantless searches merely on verbal requests from military authorities. One short paragraph began by stating that “The term ‘mass raid’ will not be employed by the Attorney General” but ended with the statement “all of the alien enemy premises in a given area can be searched at the same moment.” A prior paragraph recognized that there were “mixed occupancy dwellings” inhabited by native-born citizens and their alien parents or other relatives and treated these as “alien enemy’s premises.” Although Biddle and his deputy, Assistant Attorney General James J. Rowe, who signed the memorandum, would never say that the Constitution was “just a scrap of paper,” what they agreed to, despite their protestations, effectively nullified it.
Executive Order 9066, drafted in the War Department sometime after February 11 when Roosevelt gave Stimson “carte blanche,” and signed in the White House on February 19, is a wonderful example of Aesopian language. It has neither ethnic nor geographic specificity, and were it to be discovered in the year 3001 without other documents giving its context, the future historian might reasonably conclude that it was a relief measure. Its official title, almost never used, is “AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS.” After authorizing the Secretary of War and “Military Commanders” he might designate to create “military areas . . . from which any or all persons may be excluded,” it further authorized the secretary “to provide for residents . . . such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary . . . until other arrangements are made.”

We now know the whole chain of events which this order set off. A second executive order, 9106, established the War Relocation Authority on March 18, 1942, and ordered its director to “formulate and effectuate a program for the removal . . . of the persons or classes of persons [designated under Executive Order 9066] and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.” He was further ordered to “provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, . . . provide for their needs [and] for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects. . . .”

Other parts of Executive Order 9106 authorized the use of the United States Employment Service and established a War Relocation Work Corps in which persons would be “enlisted.” The work corps proved to be a phantom that was never activated. These words misled the first director of the War Relocation Authority, Milton S. Eisenhower, into believing, until he met with western governors at Salt Lake City on April 7, that the “relocation centers” could evolve into something more like the New Deal’s subsistence homesteads and less like the concentration camps that they became. (It must be remembered that the mass expulsion and incarceration started only at the end of March.)

Even as the mass round-up of West Coast Nikkei began, with an isolated group on Bainbridge Island, a short ferry ride from Seattle, the government’s wordsmiths were inventing new language. A “Civilian Exclusion Order” dated March 24, 1942, signed by Gen. John L. DeWitt and ominously numbered “No. 1,” directed all “Japanese persons, both alien and nonalien” to report to the ferryboat landing on March 30 for “temporary residence in a reception center elsewhere,” bringing with them only what they could carry, including “blankets and linens . . . toilet articles . . .
clothing . . . knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls, and cups for each member of the family."** xxxv

Unlike most later orders, which moved persons first to neighboring, temporary enclosures called “Assembly Centers,” the 257 Bainbridge Islanders were sent by train to Manzanar in southern California, as no camp in the Pacific Northwest was ready for occupancy. **xxxvi

Thus began the wartime incarceration of the West Coast Japanese Americans, an incarceration that would last, for some, almost four years. Begun under military auspices and subject to some military control throughout its existence, the incarcerated people whom I have called prisoners without trial were, during the course of the spring and summer of 1942, turned over to the civilian War Relocation Authority. The WRA was staffed at the top and in most of its middle management by persons who would not have instituted the kind of repressive program that they were called upon to execute. Its second and last director, Dillon S. Myer, who was less liberal than many of his staffers, wrote in his memoir that:

<EX>I believed, and still believe, that a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the West Coast military area may have been justified and feasible in early 1943 [sic] (<M>he surely meant 1942), but I do not believe that a mass evacuation was ever justified; furthermore I believe that there was no valid argument for the continuation of the exclusion orders beyond the spring of 1943, as indicated by our letter to Secretary Stimson in March of 1943.** xxxvii</EX>

The WRA accepted the army’s nomenclature and generally tried to put the best possible face on what it did. The captive Japanese had been “evacuated,” a word associated with rescue. The people who were in “relocation centers” were “residents,” not inmates. Like other government agencies, it conducted a public relations campaign that tried to emphasize the positive aspects of what it did. Its photographs show “happy campers”; its press releases hailed military volunteers and ignored, as much as possible, the protesters and especially the draft resisters. So relatively successful was this wartime government propaganda that, as late as 1969, two liberal authors thoroughly opposed to the incarceration and exile could identify Heart Mountain, where the draft resistance began, as a “happy camp.”** xxxviii The WRA and its administrators particularly resisted the notion that they were in charge of “concentration camps.”

208
The first WRA director, Milton Eisenhower, in his 1974 memoir, is explicit about this. A specialist in “information” his next assignment would be to the Office of War Information he wrote:

<EX>We called the relocation centers “evacuation centers.” Never did we refer to them as concentration camps.</EX>

Similarly, his successor, Dillon S. Myer, like Eisenhower, also from the Department of Agriculture, wrote in his 1971 memoir that:

<EX>Relocation centers were called “concentration camps” by many writers and commentators, but they were very different from the normal concept of what a concentration camp is like.</EX>

Lower down in the WRA hierarchy the same kinds of postwar views existed. One of the most determined literary attacks on the notion that Japanese Americans were placed in concentration camps came from Harold S. Jacoby, a member of the sociology faculty at the College of the Pacific who, in March 1942, concerned by what he saw as unjust treatment of Japanese Americans, sought and achieved employment with the WRA, first at Tule Lake and then in Chicago as assistant supervisor of resettlement there. He was clearly one of what psychiatrist Alexander Leighton called approvingly the “people-minded” WRA administrators. In his 1996 memoir he attacked vigorously the notion that the WRA establishments were concentration camps. Part of his argument was that the concentration camps of the Nazis and the Soviets were much worse places. Another is that only the books published after 1967 called them concentration camps. And, finally, he argued that inmates were sometimes allowed to leave for work. (He might have added that others were allowed to leave the camps to go shopping in nearby towns, etc.)

Language usage was not just a postwar concern of WRA leaders. Thomas Bodine, a Quaker activist who was an important and effective staff member of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, remembered in May 2000 that during the war “we couldn’t use the [term concentration camps] during the work we did or the Government might have cut off granting leaves to the students we were helping.”
But higher up in the government hierarchy there were people who were willing to call a spade a bloody shovel. Franklin Roosevelt himself called the camps for Japanese concentration camps on more than one public occasion, and Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, dissenting in the Korematsu case, which, in effect, said the incarceration of American citizens was constitutional, insisted that:

<EX>This is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was <I>Hirabayashi</>. . . . It is a case of convicting a citizen . . . for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry. . . .</EX>

More prosaically, an anonymous cataloguer at the Library of Congress established the subject heading “Concentration Camps<sup>M</sup> United States of America” which, so far, contains only items about the wartime incarceration of the Japanese Americans and its sequelae.<sup>xlvi</sup> But the general practice, especially after the liberation of the Nazi death camps, was to avoid the blunt term. Before the spring of 1945 the term concentration camp was not synonymous with death camp. The term was first applied to camps set up for noncombatants<sup>M</sup>as opposed to prisoners of war<sup>M</sup>by the British during the Boer War of 1899<sup>N</sup>1902.<sup>xlvii</sup> The reason that Eisenhower, Myer, Jacoby, and others associated with administering the camps reacted so strongly against using the term concentration camps is that such usage made them, by extension, concentration camp keepers and seemed to put them in the same category as notorious Nazis and Japanese, and, eventually, Adolf Eichmann.<sup>xlvi</sup> Incarcerated people themselves sometimes used the term concentration camp while they were in confinement, especially while protesting against aspects of government policy. For example, in a meeting at Heart Mountain in February 1943 during the “registration crisis,” one speaker said:

<EX>Although we have yellow skins, we too are Americans. We have an American upbringing, therefore we believe in fair play. Our firm conviction is that we would be useless Americans if we did not assert our constitutional rights now; for, unless our status as citizens is cleared and we are really fighting for the perpetuation of democracy, especially
when our fathers, mothers, and families are in concentration camps, even though they are not charged with any crimes.

I suspect that the term was not commonly used, but since the major sources for contemporary inmate perceptions, the camp newspapers, were published under the watchful eyes of WRA staffers, its nonuse there is not significant. I have read a large number of letters written from the camps. My distinct impression is that the term was not much used in them, but since the question of nomenclature had not yet become significant to me when I was reading them in various archives, I did not keep track of its occurrence.

What is clear is that once the war was over and for decades afterwards the prevailing term among the mainland Nisei was “camp,” although “evacuation,” “relocation,” and, to a lesser degree, “internment” were all used more or less interchangeably. When two Nisei met for the first time, an all but inevitable question was “What camp were you in?” When the past was discussed, two parameters were constant: “before the war” and “after camp.” The ambiguity of the word “camp” makes it possible to argue that it was short for “concentration camp,” but I am certain, but cannot demonstrate, that in the vast majority of cases it was short for “relocation camp” or “evacuation camp.” In nearly a thousand interviews and conversations with Nikkei before the redress campaign began, I can remember only a few instances in which the term “concentration camp” was used by a community member. On the other hand the only Nikkei I can remember complaining about my use of the term was Mike Masaoka in 1971 or 1972. On several occasions Caucasian Holocaust survivors similarly complained. This ambiguity, plus the notorious reluctance of the Nisei to talk about their wartime experiences with their children and grandchildren, led more than one Sansei to believe that “camp” stood for some kind of summer vacation that their parents used to go on.1

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When one examines the postwar printed record, whether memoirs by former inmates and officials or accounts by scholars and others, the result is pretty much the same. The terminology used by the government <M> evacuation and relocation <M> prevails, plus, for almost all the Nikkei authors and some scholars, the ambiguous “camp.” Nothing better exemplifies the difference between expressed
Nikkei attitudes just after the war and three to four decades later than successive editions of two outstanding Nisei memoirs.

The first, Min＜e＞ Okubo’s pioneering 1946 illustrated text, 《Citizen 13660》, dealt only with wartime and told of evacuation from Berkeley and confinement at Tanforan＜M＞in a horse stall＜M＞and at Topaz. The soon-to-be ubiquitous “camp” was the most common term, but otherwise standard government terminology＜M＞including relocation and evacuation＜M＞was used. Identical words punctuate the preface to the first reprint edition, dated May 1, 1978, but by the time of the second reprint edition just five years later, Okubo had testified before the CWRIC, and her preface speaks of “Americans and Alaskan Aleuts who had been forcibly removed from their homes and incarcerated in concentration camps” (xi), but in the rest of the new text reverts to the old standard language. In addition, the word “internment” and the phrase “internment camp” have been added to her vocabulary in describing what she endured, whereas in the original such language had been reserved for the process undergone by many Issei, as in “Father had been whisked away to an internment camp” (11).＜ii＞

A similar pattern may be discerned in the two editions of Monica Sone’s 1953 memoir, 《Nisei Daughter》, which deals with a Seattle girlhood and devotes its final two-fifths to uprooting from Seattle, life in the Puyallup Assembly Center and the Minidoka Relocation Center, and resettlement in Chicago and at an Indiana college. Its text uses only terminology that the WRA would have approved. But in her preface to the 1979 edition, the second, one-sentence paragraph shows clearly that consciousness-raising had taken place:

＜EX＞The ten concentration camps, which received 120,000 of us in 1942, were finally closed in 1946. (xv)＜ii＞

Since I have reviewed the first three decades of scholarly literature about the wartime incarceration elsewhere, it will not be repeated here.＜iii＞ By that time (1975) the broad outlines of what can be called a “master narrative” had emerged. Most scholars had generally agreed that the wartime incarceration was needless and would have endorsed the 1982 CWRIC conclusion cited above. Even earlier, in 1967, when Harry Kitano and I organized the first academic conference devoted to the wartime experience of the Nikkei, held at UCLA, we found it impossible to find anyone willing to defend the actions of 1942.
But that early scholarly consensus that the incarceration of the Japanese Americans had been wrong did not mean that historians paid much attention to it. In what was perhaps the outstanding American history textbook of the immediate postwar decades and certainly the most liberal Richard Hofstadter, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron in a text of 758 pages could say only this in their section on “Civilian Mobilization” in what was not yet the “Good War”:

<EX>Since almost no one doubted the necessity for the war, there was much less intolerance than there had been in World War I, although large numbers of Japanese-Americans were put into internment camps under circumstances that many Americans were later to judge unfair or worse. \( ^{l_{iv}} \) </EX>

Note that the term “internment camp” has somehow, as they say, crept into the language, where it has remained.

This down-playing of the negative aspects of the wartime experience was a corollary of what can be called American secular triumphalism, which affected people on the left as well as those who liked Ike and were wild about Harry. Even today, the topic of conscientious objection, for example, is little discussed. \( ^{l_{iv}} \) It is not an accident that the first scholarly critique of the rationale for the incarceration, the courageous essays by Eugene V. Rostow, wrote off the event as a “mistake” rather than as a logical outgrowth of centuries of racism. \( ^{l_{vi}} \) And, as late as the mid-1970s, I could lecture about the wartime incarceration at an elite college, such as Hobart and William Smith, and have students ask me afterwards if that “really happened.”

By that time, two books about the incarceration had appeared that used the term concentration camps in their titles. \( ^{l_{vii}} \) These works gave an increased credibility to the use of the term, a credibility, as we have seen, that was challenged not only by persons like McCloy, Eisenhower, and Myer, who had been accessories to the incarceration, either before or after the fact, but also by three other categories of persons:

1. A whole spectrum of conservatives and self-styled patriots who were simply appalled that such a dreadful term could be applied to their country. The reactions of this group ranged from mild annoyance to absolute frenzy on the part of a few zealots, such as the incarceration denier Lillian Baker. \( ^{l_{viii}} \)
(2) A sizable number of Holocaust survivors and their supporters who resented deeply the term being used for anything as “mild” as the American incarceration. Some clearly felt that the term belonged to them. The most celebrated instance of this occurred in 1998, when a protest by some Jews against the use of the term “concentration camp” in the title of an exhibition from the Japanese American National Museum, scheduled to open on Ellis Island, caused such a controversy that the National Park Service superintendent in charge cancelled the exhibition until her superiors intervened.

(3) And finally, there are those, such as historian Alice Yang Murray, who, while fully understanding the arguments for using the term, nevertheless feel that:

<EX>while I agree that places like Manzanar and Tule Lake fulfill the dictionary definition of a “concentration camp,” I personally can’t accept the designation. The term “concentration camp” may once have been a euphemism for a Nazi “extermination camp,” but I think that over time the two kinds of camps have become inextricably linked in the popular imagination. In other words, I believe the meaning of the term “concentration camp” has changed over time. During World War II, officials and commentators could say Japanese Americans were confined in concentration camps without evoking images of Nazi atrocities. I don’t think that this is true today.

Given this widespread resistance, it is clearly unrealistic to expect everyone to agree to use the contested term concentration camp, even though I believe that it is the most appropriate term.

But it seems equally clear to me that it is not unreasonable to expect scholars to cease using both the incorrect prevalent term “internment camp” and the stock phrase “the internment of the Japanese Americans.” There are two very good reasons to suggest this.

In the first place, while there were surely injustices involved in the internment process, as there always are when compulsion is involved, it did follow the forms of law and was a recognized legal procedure dating back in American law to the War of 1812. The eleven thousand or so persons who were interned in the United States during World War II have not, until quite recently, been the subject of much historical scrutiny. What has to be remembered is that those persons were taken into custody because of their status: all were alien nationals of a nation against which the United States was at war, each was seized for reasons supposedly based on his or her behavior, and each was entitled to an individual hearing before a board. No one who reads the fine study by Louis Fiset
of the internment process as it affected Iwao Matsushita can conflate his circumstances with those of Japanese Americans incarcerated under authority of Executive Order 9066.\(^{lx}\)

In the second place, the conflation of the two processes has allowed some authors to write as if what happened to a tiny minority of unnaturalized Italian and German residents was somehow equivalent to the mass incarceration of some eighty-thousand American citizens of Japanese ancestry and some forty-thousand Japanese nationals who were barred from naturalization by race.\(^{lxi}\)

As I have tried to show, there has been a long history of using euphemistic language about the wartime atrocity that was wreaked upon the Japanese Americans of the West Coast during and after World War II. Begun with malice aforethought by government officials, politicians, and journalists, it has been continued, largely in thoughtless innocence, by scholars. As we are in the seventh decade after the promulgation of Executive Order 9066, it is high time that scholars begin to call things by their right names. Let us hear no more about the “internment of the Japanese Americans.”\(^{lxiii}\)
Words Do Matter: A Note on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans

I wish to thank the editors, the anonymous reader for the press, and, above all, Max Paul Friedman for thoughtful and intelligent suggestions which have, I think, improved this essay.


ii I also had objections to the term “relocation.” “Exile” is more appropriate.


iv Aliens Act of June 24, 1798 (1 Stat. 570). The lack of a declared war prevented any internment or treason trials during the Korean and Vietnam Wars or in such shorter actions as Desert Storm.


The act, also known as the Smith Act, was 54 Stat. 670. It had three titles, the first of which dealt with “interference with the military or naval forces of the United States,” the second with “additional deportable classes of aliens,” and only the third with the “registration and fingerprinting” of aliens. Title I was used in the Cold War era to convict many leaders of the American Communist Party. For an illuminating discussion of Titles II and III, see Richard W. Steele, “The War on Intolerance: The Reformulation of American Nationalism, 1939-1943,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 9 (fall 1989): 9-35. The registration provisions, unenforced for decades, were applied selectively after 9/11 by the Department of Justice to deport a variety of immigrants, mostly Muslims.

Except for a handful of World War I veterans, Japanese were not eligible for naturalization until the law was changed in 1952. Anyone, regardless of race or ethnicity, born in the United States is a citizen thanks to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1868.

Proclamation No. 2525, December 7, 1941, and Proclamations No. 2526 and No. 2527, December 8, 1941. Similar control over Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian aliens was covered by Proclamation No. 2563 of July 17, 1942; the handful of aliens interned under the last are ignored in the remainder of this essay.

For some of the uses to which Koreans were put during the war, see Hyung-Ju Ahn, *Between Two Adversaries: Korean Interpreters at Japanese Alien Enemy Detention Centers during World War II* (Fullerton: Oral History Program, California State University, 2002).

The organizations creating the lists were primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Special Defense Unit of the Department of Justice, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Intelligence Branch (G-2) of the army. Obviously, the lists were only as good as the persons compiling them. They were filled with errors of omission and commission, particularly with regard to Japanese aliens, as, to the best of my knowledge, only one American naval intelligence official, Lt. Comdr. Kenneth D. Ringle, could read Japanese. For his activities, see my Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), 183, 210-13. The controversial Ellis Mark Zacharias, who was fluent in Japanese, was out of favor and not involved in intelligence work at the outbreak of war. The best single work dealing with any part of the U.S. intelligence apparatus before and during the war is Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy’s Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983). See also Marc Gallicchio, “Zacharias, Ellis Mark,” American National Biography Online, February 2000, at <<http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00340.html>>


For the State Department’s concern for Americans in enemy countries, see P. Scott Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States and Japan during the Second World War, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1987).


Many of those brought by the government from Latin America were in family units. Karen L. Riley, Schools Behind Barbed Wire: The Untold Story of Wartime Internment and the Children of Arrested Enemy Aliens (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), describes the INS family camp at Crystal City, Texas. Roger Daniels, “Educating Youth in American’s Wartime Detention Camps,” History of Education Quarterly 41 (spring 2003): 92-103, reviews the literature on education in WRA and INS camps.

Incarcerated Japanese Americans had no such recourse as they were incarcerated not for suspected subversion or memberships, but because of their ethnicity. There were, however, government programs that enabled many Japanese Americans to leave the camps for work, military service, and education.


William L. Neuman, “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Japan, 1913-1933,” Pacific Historical Review 22 (1953): 143-53, at 148. FDR’s essay was published as “Shall We Trust Japan?” Asia 23 (1923): 475-78, 526, 528, and was sanguine about future relationships.

The Life version is first. Both are dated December 22, 1941, but were on the newsstands and in the mail the previous week. Despite prompt refutation, e.g., “No Certain Way to Tell Japanese from Chinese,” Science News Letter (December 20, 1941), this nonsense was widely believed.

This cartoon was, I believe, first republished in Paul Milkman, PM: A New Deal in Journalism, 1940-1948 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1997). For some two hundred of Geisel’s PM cartoons, see Richard H. Minear, Dr. Suess Goes to War (New York: The New Press, 1999). Those and two hundred others may be seen on a University of California, San Diego website: <<http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/speccoll/dspolitic/Frame.htm>> UCSD has a “Dr. Suess Collection” in its Mandeville Special Collections Library. The only book-length study of Geisel’s work, Ruth K. MacDonald’s Dr. Suess (Boston: Twayne, 1988), mentions his PM career in passing,
noting only “his most notable contribution being his anti-Nazi cartoons ridiculing Hitler” (8).

xxvii See, for example, Dennis Ogawa. From Japs to Japanese: The Evolution of Japanese American Stereotypes (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1971).


xxix CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, 18. A 1997 University of Washington Press reprint is definitive as it contains important materials, including specific recommendations for redress, that were issued by the commission in 1983 and thus not included in the original. CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Seattle: University of Washington Press and the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, 1997).

xxx Proclamations 2525, 2526, 2527. They may be conveniently consulted in Roger Daniels, ed., American Concentration Camps, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1989). Biddle’s comments on the internment process are in his autobiographical In Brief Authority (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1962), 207-9. Although he distinguishes between the selective internment and the program under E.O. 9066, he calls the latter “mass internment.” His statistical data are erroneous.

xxxi The memoranda may be found conveniently in United States. War Department. Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1943), 4-6.


xxxiii Both executive orders are reprinted in Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 1.

xxxiv It is not clear who dreamed up that innocuous term or its predecessor, assembly center, but the most likely suspects are Col. Karl Robin Bendetsen, the army lawyer who managed the expulsion of the Nikkei from the West Coast, and/or a Census Bureau bureaucrat, Dr. Calvert L. Dedrick. For the latter, see Roger Daniels, “The Bureau of the Census and the Relocation of the Japanese Americans: A Note and a Document,” Amerasia Journal 9 (#1 1982): 101-5. Work in progress by demographer William Seltzer and Margo Anderson, the leading

Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 and accompanying instructions are reprinted in Daniels, American Concentration Camps, vol. 1.

War Department, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. Table 47, 363. One additional Bainbridge Islander is reported as being sent to an unspecified relocation center.


Thomas Bodine to Allan W. Austin, 17 May 2000. Austin shared this letter with me. A revised version of his excellent doctoral dissertation, “From Concentration Camp to Campus: A
History of the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, 1942-1946” (University of Cincinnati, 2001), is forthcoming from the University of Illinois Press.

xliv See, for example, Press Conference 982, November 21, 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.


xlvi There is also what the Library of Congress calls a “narrower heading”: “Japanese Americans Evacuation and Relocation, 1942-45.”

xlvii Both the Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, and the Merriam Webster 10th Collegiate Dictionary give 1901 as the first usage. But utilization of a digitalized database of the New York Times to examine all issues during 1898 produced eleven “hits” for the phrase “concentration camps.” All, however, were without pejorative implication and described camps in which various U.S. Army units were concentrated before deployment overseas. One such example, on June 1 began: “The Quartermaster General’s Department, in response to the complaints coming from the various concentration camps of the delay in securing supplies and equipment. . . .” For the latest scholarship on the South African concentration camps, see the essays by Shula Marks and Elizabeth van Heyningen in Greg Cuthbertson et al., Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002).

xlviii It may well be that Dillon Myer’s negative reaction to being so characterized in Richard Drinnon’s Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), drove him into the arms of Lillian Baker, a vociferous opponent of any kind of amelioration for the wartime and postwar injuries that Japanese Americans endured. Too ill to appear at the CWRIC’s Washington hearings, Myer authorized Baker to read a statement opposing the idea of an apology. For Baker, see her Dishonoring America: The Falsification of World War II History (Medford, Oreg.: Webb Research Group, 1994).

xlix As quoted in Myer, Uprooted Americans, 73, no source given, but probably from government surveillance of the speaker (Kiyoshi Okamoto?).

1 A book by Prof. Alice Yang Murray, which is to be published soon, reveals that internal WRA memoranda warned against the use of the term “camp.”


Allan R. Bosworth, America’s Concentration Camps (New York: Norton, 1967), and Daniels, Concentration Camps, USA.

I am in the process of writing an essay about Baker and the relatively rare phenomenon of denial that any kind of punitive detention of Japanese Americans took place. I went to the Baker manuscripts at the Hoover Institute thinking that I might find links between her and the California-based group of Holocaust deniers centered around the so-called Institute for Historical Research. I found only negative connections. Baker affirmed the Holocaust, and I have mused that if there had been gas chambers at the American camps, she might have stopped complaining about what she liked to call “The Concentration Camp Conspiracy.”

The controversy is treated in the following sources, which include an editorial and letters to the editor, all from the New York Times: Somini Sengupta, “What Is a Concentration Camp? Ellis Island Exhibit Prompts a Debate,” 8 March 1998; “Debate on Camps Goes Back to

From a book by Alice Yang Murray which is to be published soon. Used with permission.

